Steganographic protocols enables one to "embed" covert messages into inconspicuous data over a public communication channel in such a way that no one, aside from the sender and the intended receiver can even detect the presence of the secret message. In this paper, we provide a new provably-secure, private-key steganographic encryption protocol. We prove the security of our protocol in the complexitytheoretic framework where security is quantified as the advantage (compared to a random guess) that the adversary has in distinguishing between innocent covertext and stegotext that embeds a message of his choice. The fundamental building block of our steganographic encryption protocol is a "one-time stegosystem" that allows two parties to transmit messages of length at most that of the shared key with information-theoretic security guarantees. The employment of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) permits secure transmission of longer messages in the same way that such a generator allows the use of one-time pad encryption for messages longer than the key in symmetric encryption. In this paper, we initiate the study of employing randomness extractors in a steganographic protocol construction to embed secret messages over the channel. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time randomness extractors have been applied in steganography.
Introduction
The steganographic communication problem can be best described using Simmons [13] formulation of the problem -In this scenario, prisoners Alice and Bob wish to communicate securely in the presence of an adversary, called the "Warden," who monitors whether they exchange "conspicuous" messages. In particular, Alice and Bob may exchange messages that adhere to a certain channel distributions that represents "inconspicuous" communication. By controlling the messages that are transmitted over such a channel, Alice and Bob may exchange messages that cannot be detected by the Warden. There have been two approaches in formalizing this problem, one based on information theory [1, 15, 5] and one based on complexity theory [3, 4] . The latter approach is more concrete and has the potential of allowing more efficient constructions. Most steganographic constructions supported by provable security guarantees are instantiations of the following basic procedure (often referred to as "rejection-sampling").
The problem specifies a family of message distributions (the "channel distributions") that provide a number of possible options for a so-called "covertext" to be transmitted. Additionally, the sender and the receiver possess some sort of private information (typically a keyed hash function, MAC, or other similar function) that maps channel messages to a single bit. In order to send a message bit m, the sender draws a covertext from the channel distribution, applies the function to the covertext and checks whether it happens to produce the "stegotext" m he originally wished to transmit. If this is the case, the covertext is transmitted. In case of failure, this procedure is repeated. While this is a fairly concrete procedure, there are a number of choices to be made with both practical and theoretical significance. From the security viewpoint, one is primarily interested in the choice of the function that is shared between the sender and the receiver. From a practical viewpoint, one is primarily interested in how the channel is implemented and whether it conforms to the various constraints that are imposed on it by the steganographic protocol specifications (e.g., are independent draws from the channel allowed? does the channel remember previous draws? etc.).
Our model differs from the traditional approach to steganography where the sender modifies a covertext that is known to the adversary in an effort to embed secret data. Such an approach is secure only against adversaries with limited detection capability. This approach is found, for instance, in several software applications which manipulate certain pixels of visual images to embed hidden information. While such minor perturbations to an image may be imperceptible to the human eye, it is trivially discerned by an algorithm with access to the original cover image.
As mentioned above, the security of a stegosystem can be naturally phrased in information-theoretic terms (cf. [1] ) or in complexity-theoretic terms [3] . Informally, the latter approach considers the following experiment for the warden-adversary: The adversary selects a message to be embedded and receives either covertexts that embed the message or covertexts simply drawn from the channel distribution (without any embedding). The adversary is then asked to distinguish between the two cases. Clearly, if the probability of success is very close to 1/2 it is natural to claim that the stegosystem provides security against such (eavesdropping) adversarial activity. Formulation of stronger attacks (such as active attacks) is also possible.
Given the above framework, Hopper et al. [3] provided a provably secure stegosystem that pairs rejection sampling with a pseudorandom function family. In this article we take an alternative approach to the design of provably secure stegosystems. Our main contribution is the design of a building block that we call a one-time stegosystem: this is a steganographic protocol that is meant to be used for a single message transmission and is proven secure in an information-theoretic sense, provided that the key that is shared between the sender and the receiver is of sufficient length. In particular we show that we can securely transmit a ν bit message with a secret key of length ν; Our basic building block is a natural analogue of a one time-pad for steganography. It is based on the rejection sampling technique outlined above in combination with randomness extractors. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time randomness extractors have been employed in the design of steganographic protocols. Given a one-time stegosystem, it is fairly straightforward to construct provably secure steganographic encryption for longer messages by using a pseudorandom generator (PRG) to stretch a random seed that is shared by the sender and the receiver to sufficient length. The resulting stegosystem is provably secure in the computational model.
Definitions and Tools

Preliminaries
We say that a function µ : N → R is negligible if for every positive polynomial p(·), there exists an N such that for all n > N , µ(n) < 1 p(n) . We use the notation x ← X to denote sampling an element x from a distribution X and the notation x ∈ R S to denote sampling an element x uniformly at random from a set S. For a function f and a distribution X on its domain, f (X) denotes the distribution of sampling x from X and applying f to x. The uniform distribution on {0, 1} d is denoted by U d and U (X) denotes the uniform distribution on a finite set X. We denote the length (in bits) of a string or integer s by |s| and the cardinality of a set S is denoted by |S|. The concatenation of string s 1 and string s 2 is denoted by s 1 • s 2 . "log" indicates the logarithm base 2 and "ln" denotes the natural logarithm. For completeness, we record below a few inequalities we use.
Theorem 1 (Markov's inequality). Let X be a random variable that takes only non-negative real values. Then for every α > 0, we have
Theorem 2 (Law of Total Probability). Let A and B be events in a probability space Ω, and 0
Theorem 3 (Boole's inequality). Let A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A m be a countable set of events in a probability space Ω. Then,
ǫ-biased functions
Definition 1 ( [14] ). Let P be a distribution with a finite support X. A function f : X → Y is ǫ-biased if
We say that f is unbiased if f is ǫ-biased for ǫ a negligible function of the appropriate security parameter and finally f is said to be perfectly unbiased if
min-entropy
We use min-entropy to quantify how much randomness is contained in a probability distribution. The minentropy of a distribution is a variant of the Shannon entropy which measures the amount of randomness in the worst-case as opposed to Shannon entropy which measures the expected amount of randomness in the distribution. Intuitively, a distribution with min-entropy k contains k random bits. A distribution X is said to have min-entropy of at least k bits if the probability it assigns to each element in its range is bounded above by 2 −k . A distribution with min-entropy at least k is called a k-source.
Definition 2. The min-entropy of a random variable X, taking values in a set V , is the quantity
Statistical Distance
We use statistical distance as the measure of distance between two random variables.
Definition 3. Let X and Y be random variables which both take values in a finite set S with probability distributions P X and P Y . The statistical distance between X and Y is defined as
We say that X and
The statistical distance is the largest possible difference between the probabilities that the two probability distributions can assign to the same event. If the statistical distance between two random variables is small, then no probabilistic algorithm can distinguish between them without sampling a large amount of data. We will use the following properties of statistical distance which follow directly from the definition. Theorem 4. Let X, Y and Z be random variables taking values in a finite set S. We have
In this paper, we often use statistical distance as the measure of distance between two probability distributions described by the random variables. We also use the terms statistical distance and distance in total variation interchangeably to mean the same measure.
Theorem 5 ([12]
). Let X and Y be random variables which take values in a finite set S with probability distributions P X and P Y . For every set S ′ ⊆ S,
and equality holds for some S ′ ⊆ S, and in particular, for the set
as well as its complement.
Proof. Let us partition the set S into two disjoint subsets S 0 and S 1 as defined below.
Since P X and P Y are probability distributions,
This implies that,
is small, then there is no statistical test that can effectively distinguish between the distributions of X and Y .
Theorem 6 ([12]
). If S and T are finite sets, X and Y are random variables taking values in the set S with probability distributions P X and P Y , and f :
Proof. We know from Theorem 5 that
where the final inequality follows again from Theorem 5.
See [12] for further discussions on statistical distance and their properties.
Randomness Extractors
Randomness extractors are deterministic functions that operate on arbitrary distributions with sufficient randomness and ouput "almost" uniformly distributed, independent random bits. Extractors require an additional input: a short seed of truly random bits as a catalyst to "extract" randomness from such distributions, i.e., the input of an extractor contains two independent sources of randomness: the actual distribution (the source) and the seed.
For our application, we require a stronger property from the extractor. We need the output of the extractor to remain uniform given the knowledge of the seed used. In other words, we require the extractor to extract randomness only from the source and not from the seed. A way of enforcing this condition is to demand that when the seed is concatenated to the output, the resulting distribution is still ǫ-close to uniform. Such an extractor is called a strong extractor to distinguish from the non-strong extractors defined above. Non-strong Extractors guarantee to extract randomness from k-sources on an average seed while strong extractors guarantee to extract randomness for most seeds. In this paper, we use the term extractor to refer to a strong extractor. Extractors (strong) were first defined by Nisan and Zuckerman [2] .
We refer to n as the length of the source, k as the min-entropy threshold and to ǫ as the error of the extractor, the ratio k/n as the entropy rate of the source X and to the ratio m/k as the fraction of randomness extracted by the extractor. The entropy loss of the extractor is defined as k + d − m. The two inputs of the extractor have joint min-entropy of at least k + d and the entropy loss measures how much of this randomness was "lost" in the extraction process. Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [8] showed that every non-trivial (k, ǫ)-extractor cannot extract all the randomness present in its inputs and suffers an entropy loss of χ = 2log(1/ǫ) + O(1). For our application, we need efficient, explicit strong extractor constructions as defined below.
is an explicit (k, ǫ)-strong extractor if Ext(x, y) can be computed in polynomial time in its input length poly(n, d(n)) and for every n, Ext n is a (k(n), ǫ(n))-extractor.
An important property of strong extractors which makes it attractive for our application is that for any k-source, a (1 − ǫ) fraction of the seeds extract randomness from that source. The following theorem asserts this statement formally and follows directly from the definition of a strong extractor.
By the definition of statistical distance, for ω ∈ {0, 1} m and seed S ∈ {0, 1} d , this can be written as
The expectation can then be obtained as
We now invoke Markov's inequality from Theorem 1 to conclude that
See the survey papers [11, 6, 7] for more details on extractors and their properties. In this paper, we use the explicit strong extractor construction by Raz, Reingold and Vadhan [9] which works on sources of any min-entropy on strings of length n. It extracts all the min-entropy using O(log 3 n) additional random seed bits while achieving an optimal entropy loss (up to an additive constant) of χ = 2 log(1/ǫ) + O(1) bits.
Theorem 8 (RRV Extractor [9] ). For every n, k ∈ N, and ǫ > 0 such that k ≤ n, there are explicit
with entropy loss χ = 2 log(1/ǫ) + O(1) bits and requires seeds of length d = O(log 2 n · log(1/ǫ) · log k) bits.
Channel
The security of a steganography protocol is measured by the adversary's ability to distinguish between "normal" and "covert" messages over a communication channel. To characterize normal communication we need to define and formalize the communication channel. We follow the standard terminology used in the literature [3, 1, 14] to define communication channels. We let Σ = {σ 1 , . . . , σ s } denote the symbols of an alphabet and treat the channel, which will be used for data transmission, as a family of random variables C = {C h } h∈Σ * ; each C h is supported on Σ. These channel distributions model a history-dependent notion of channel data: if h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h ℓ have been sent along the channel thus far, C h1,...,h ℓ determines the distribution of the next channel element.
We let C h denote the marginal channel distribution on a single symbol from Σ conditioned on the history h of already drawn symbols and C t h denotes the marginal distribution on sequences of t symbols conditioned on history h. This definition of a channel differs from the typical setting where every symbol from the alphabet is drawn independently according to some fixed distribution. This definition captures the adaptive nature of the channel by making explicit the dependence between the symbols typical in real world communications.
We assume that the channel satisfies a min-entropy constraint for all histories. This assumption is important and reasonable since without this assumption it is not possible to maintain positive information content in communications. In particular, we require that C has min-entropy δ, so that ∀h ∈ Σ * ,
Stegosystem
Definition 7. A one-time stegosystem consists of three probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
where:
• SK is the key generation algorithm; we write SK (1 ν , log(1/ǫ sec )) = k. It takes as input, the security parameter ǫ sec and the length of the message ν and produces a key k of length κ. (We typically assume that κ = κ(ν) is a monotonically increasing function of ν.)
• SE is the embedding procedure, which can access the channel; SE (1 ν , k, m, h) = c stego ∈ Σ λ . It takes as input the length of the message ν, the key k, a message m ∈ M ν {0, 1} ν to be embedded, and the history h of previously drawn covertexts. The output is the stegotext c stego ∈ Σ λ .
• SD is the extraction procedure; SD (1 ν , k, c ∈ Σ * ) = m or fail. It takes as input 1 ν , k, and some c ∈ Σ * . The output is a message m or the token fail.
Recall that the min-entropy of a random variable X, taking values in a set V , is the quantity
We say that a channel C has min-entropy δ if for all h ∈ Σ * , H ∞ (C h ) ≥ δ.
Definition 8 (Soundness).
A stegosystem S = (SK, SE, SD) is said to be (ψ(κ), δ)-sound provided that for all channels C of min-entropy δ,
One-time stegosystem security is based on the indistinguishability between a transmission that contains a steganographically embedded message and a transmission that contains no embedded messages. An adversary A against a one-time stegosystem S = (SK, SE, SD) is a pair of algorithms A = (SA 1 , SA 2 ), that plays the following game, denoted G A (1 n ):
1. A key k is generated by SK(1 ν , log(1/ǫ sec )).
2. Algorithm SA 1 receives as input the length of the message ν and outputs a triple ( m * , θ, h c ) ∈ M ν × {0, 1} * * Σ * , where θ is some additional information that will be passed to SA 2 . SA 1 is provided access to C via an oracle O(h), which takes the history h as input. O(·), on input h, returns to SA 1 an element c selected according to C h .
A bit b is chosen uniformly at random.
• If b = 0 let c * ← SE(1 ν , k, m * , h), so c * is a stegotext.
• The advantage of the adversary A over a stegosystem S is defined as:
The probability includes the coin tosses of A and SE, as well as the coin tosses of G(1 κ ). The (informationtheoretic) insecurity of the stegosystem is defined as
this maximum taken over all (time unbounded) adversaries A. Definition 9. (Security) We say that a stegosystem S = (SK, SE, SD) is (φ(ν), δ)-secure if for all channels with min-entropy δ we have InSec S (ν) ≤ φ(ν).
Rejection Sampling
A common method used in steganography employing a channel distribution is that of rejection sampling (cf. [1, 3] ). We use a variant of rejection sampling to transmit bit vectors as opposed to a single bit. Assuming that one wishes to transmit a bit vector m ∈ {0, 1} η and employs a random function f : {0, 1} q ×Σ t → {0, 1} η that is secret from the adversary, one performs the following "rejection sampling" process:
For a given history h, the procedure rejsam f h ( m, ρ) draws independent samples from the channel distribution C t h in rounds until f ( c) = m or (j > ρ). As there are at most a total of ρ + 1 rounds, if none of the first ρ samples drawn map to the target bit vector, the sample drawn at round ρ + 1 is returned by the procedure. Here, as defined before, Σ denotes the output alphabet of the channel, h denotes the history of the channel data at the start of the process, and C t h denotes the marginal distribution on sequences of t symbols, Σ t , given by the channel after history h. The receiver (also privy to the function f ) applies the function to the received message c ∈ Σ t and recovers m with a non-negligible success probability. The sender and the receiver may employ a joint state denoted by q in the above process (e.g., a counter), that need not be secret from the adversary. Note that the above process performs ρ + 1 draws from the channel with the same history. These draws are assumed to be independent. One basic property of rejection sampling that we use is:
Lemma 9 ([14]).
If the function f is ǫ-biased on C t h for history h, then for any ρ, m ∈ R {0, 1} η :
Proof. Let us denote the samples drawn by the procedure rejsam The probability of observing c ∈ C t h under the rejsam f h ( m, ρ) procedure is then given by 
The construction
In this section we outline our construction of a one-time stegosystem as an interaction between Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver). Alice and Bob wish to communicate over a channel with distribution C. For simplicity, we assume that the support of C h is of size |Σ| = 2 b . We also assume that C has min-entropy δ, so that ∀h ∈ Σ * , H ∞ (C h ) ≥ δ and by the additive property of min-entropy, H ∞ (C t h ) ≥ δt, i.e., C h is a δ-source and C t h is a δt-source.
A one-time stegosystem
Fix an alphabet Σ for the channel, choose a message m ′ ∈ {0, 1} ν and the security parameter ǫ sec . Our stegosystem uses the RRV strong-extractor construction as described in Theorem 8 which extracts randomness from the marginal channel distribution C t h supported on {0, 1} t·b by rejection sampling as described in Section 2.8.
Alice and Bob agree on the following:
Extractor Construction. Alice and Bob agree to use the explicit RRV strong-extractor construction as described in Theorem 8. They use a shared seed s ∈ R {0, 1} d . The notation E s E s (·) stands for the extractor E(·, ·) used with the seed s i.e., E(·, s).
One-Time Pad. Alice and Bob use a shared secret key k OT P ∈ R {0, 1} ν to randomize their message.
Key generation consists of selecting the seed s ∈ R {0, 1} d and the one-time pad secret key k OT P ∈ R {0, 1} ν . For our protocol, the shared seed need not be secret. The encoding procedure accepts an input message and outputs stego text of length λ. We will analyze the stegosystem below in terms of arbitrary parameters t, d, λ, c and ǫ sec relegating discussion of how these parameters determine the overall efficiency of the system to Section 3.4.
Alice and Bob then communicate using the algorithm SE for embedding and SD for extracting described in Figure 1 . In SE, after applying the one-time pad, we use rejsam Es h ( m i , ρ) to obtain an element c i of the channel for each block m i of the message. Here, the history h represents the current history at the time of rejection sampling which gets updated after sampling. The resulting stegotext c 1 c 2 . . . c ⌈ν/c log ν⌉ is denoted c stego . In SD the received stegotext is parsed block by block by evaluating the extractor using seed s; this results in a message block. After performing this for each received block, a message of size ν is received, which is subjected to the one-time pad decoding to obtain the original message. The detailed security and correctness analysis follow in the next two sections.
Security
In this section we argue about the security of our one-time stegosystem. We wish to quantify the security of our stegosystem by the statistical distance between the "normal" and "covert" message distributions over the communication channel. First, by Lemma 9, observe that if the function f is ǫ-biased on C 
Suppose in our stegosystem construction, [ Figure 1 ], we had used an independent and uniformly chosen seed s i ∈ {0, 1} d for each message block i = 1, 2, · · · , ⌈ν/c log ν⌉, the statistical distance between the natural channel distribution and the output of procedure SE can be given by
ǫ⌈ν/c log ν⌉ by the triangle inequality.
Next, we present an upper bound on the statistical distance between the "natural" channel distribution and the output of the encoding procedure SE when using a single seed s ∈ R {0, 1}
d over all the message blocks as in our construction.
We need the following technical lemmas to prove the results of this section.
Proof. For x ∈ X denote Pr[X = x] by P x and Pr[Y x = y] by P y|x . Then we get
ν , the insecurity of the stegosystem S of Section 3.1 is bound by ℓ · √ ǫ sec + 2
√ ǫ sec , where ǫ sec is the security parameter and ℓ = ⌈ν/c log ν⌉ for some constant c.
Proof. We start the encoding procedure SE with history h which embeds message blocks into the channel adaptively using rejection sampling. We want to show that the statistical distance between the output of SE and the natural channel distribution is given by
where ℓ = ⌈ν/c log ν⌉ for some constant c and λ is the length of the output by procedure SE. First, we define some notation to capture the operation of the procedure SE. Let C ϕ denote the channel distribution C h at depth 0. Let C 1 denote the distribution at depth 1 that results by sampling c 1 ← C ϕ ; C 2 denotes the distribution at depth 2 that results by sampling c 1 ← C ϕ and c 2 ← C c1 . Similarly, let C τ denote the channel distribution at depth τ that results by sampling c 1 ← C ϕ , c 2 ← C c1 ,· · · ,c τ ← C c1•c2•···•cτ−1 . We define the random variables obtained by rejection sampling in the same fashion. Let us now formally define these families of random variables C i , R i at depth i, i = 0, 1, · · · , ℓ.
Now, pick a seed s ∈ R {0, 1} d . First, we show that at each depth τ , τ = 1, · · · , ℓ, the probability mass of distributions for which the extractor coupled with the seed s yields an √ ǫ-biased function is large. We say that a distribution C c1,c2,··· ,cτ is (s,
Otherwise we say that the distribution C is (s, √ ǫ sec )-bad. Let us define the following sets:
s denote the collection of (s, √ ǫ sec ) -good and (s, √ ǫ sec ) -bad distributions at depth τ respectively. The basic property of a strong-extractor construction that we use here is that for any distribution C with the right min-entropy, the probability over the choice of the seed s, 
Now, notice that the expected mass of G τ s over the choice of randomly picking the seed s is given by,
Consequently,
We now want to compute the probability that this expected value is small. Using Markov's inequality from Theorem 1 we get
By Boole's inequality from Theorem 3 we get
where ℓ = ⌈ν/c log ν⌉, the number of message blocks.
So, we can see that if we pick a seed s uniformly at random, with probability 1
We say that a seed s is good if ∀τ,
√ ǫ sec . From the discussion above we know that
Now, fix a good seed s. We will now prove that for a good seed s,
We prove this by induction on ℓ, the number of message blocks. Base Case: for τ = 1 :
Observe that,
Hence we can conclude that for a good seed s,
So, the statistical distance is now given by,
√ ǫ sec where ℓ = ⌈ν/c log ν⌉ for some constant c. We record the following lemma which follows from the discussion above.
Lemma 13. With SE and SD described as above, the probability that a message m of length ν is recovered from the stegosystem is at least 1 − Variable output For all seeds x ∈ {0, 1} * and y ∈ N, |G(x, 1 y )| = y and, furthermore, G(x, 1 y ) is a prefix of G(x, 1 y+1 ).
Pseudorandomness For every polynomial p the set of random variables {G(U l , 1 p(l) )} l∈N is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution U p(l) .
Note that there is a procedure G ′ that if z = G(x, 1 y ) it holds that G(x, 1 y+y ′ ) = G ′ (x, z, 1 y ′ ) (i.e., if one maintains z, one can extract the y ′ bits that follow the first y bits without starting from the beginning). For a PRG G, if A is some statistical test, then we define the advantage of A over the PRNG as follows: The insecurity of the PRNG G is then defined Note that typically in PRGs there is a procedure G ′ as well as the process G(x, 1 y ) produces some auxiliary data aux y of small length so that the rightmost y ′ bits of G(x, 1 y+y ′ ) may be sampled directly as
y ′ , aux y ). Consider now the following stegosystem S ′ = (SE ′ , SD ′ ) that can be used for arbitrary many and long messages and employs a PRG G and the one-time stegosystem (SK, SE, SD) of Section 3.1. The two players Alice and Bob, share a key of length l denoted by x. They also maintain a state N that holds the number of bits that have been transmitted already as well the auxiliary information aux N (initially empty). The function SE ′ is given input N, aux N , x, m ∈ {0, 1} n where m is the message to be transmitted. SE ′ in turn employs the PRG G to extract a number of bits κ as follows k = G ′ (x, 1 κ , aux N ). The length κ is selected to match the number of key bits that are required to transmit the message m using the one-time stegosystem of section 3.1. Once the key k is produced by the PRG the procedure SE ′ invokes the one-time stegosystem on input k, m, h. After the transmission is completed the history h, the count N , as well as the auxiliary PRG information aux N are updated accordingly. The function SD ′ is defined in a straightforward way based on SD. (where t is the time required by the adversary, q is the number of chosen hiddentext queries it makes, l is the total number of bits across all queries and γ(v) is the time required to simulate the SE ′ oracle for v bits).
